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NOTE
UNDERSTANDING THE MEASURING LIFE IN
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Part of the conventional wisdom of -the law of property is that the
Rule Against Perpetuities' is a pointlessly complex and aimlessly de-
structive relic.2 During the last ,twenty years it has been condemned
and reformed more often than in all the previous years since it emerged
in the late seventeenth century.3 Now, however, the wave of reform
seems to have spent itself, leaving the Rule on the books of all but a
few states,4 still in its common law form in most of them. Thus, despite
its reputation for obsolescence, the Rule today figures in almost every
will and trust instrument drafted and construed.
1. For a statement of the Rule and its corollaries, see notes 39-47 infra and ac-
companying text.
2. Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
826 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), held that a lawyer who drafted a will
that violated the Rule was not negligent as a matter of law:
The complaint. . . alleges that defendant drafted the will in such a manner
that the trust was invalid because it violated the rules relating to perpetuities
and restraints on alienation. These closely akin subjects have long perplexed
the courts and the bar. Professor Gray, a leading authority in the field, stated:
"There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error. Perhaps
it is because the mode of reasoning is unlike that with which lawyers are most
familiar. . . . A long list might be formed of the demonstrable blunders with
regard to its questions made by eminent men . . . and there are few lawyers
of any practice in drawing wills and settlements who have not at some time
either fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary, or at least
shuddered to think how narrowly they have escaped it." (Gray, The Rule
Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) p. xi; see also Leach, Perpetuities Legisla-
tion (1954) 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 [describing the rule as a "technicality-
ridden legal nightmare" and a "dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most
members of the bar"I.)
See also R. LYNN, THE MODERN RuLE AGAINST PERnETurraEs 10 (1966) ("Insofar as
the Rule was intended to preclude the creation of family dynasties, it has proved to be
a signal failure. As a device to facilitate marketability, it is exceptionally awkward");
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSis OF LAw 250 (1972) ("The rule has proved impossibly
complex in practice, so that its net benefits are quite probably negative"). The classic
treatise on the Rule, Gray's The Rule Against Perpetuities (1886), has been charac-
terized as "a dark book which, tradition states, no one has ever really read... ." .
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 542 (1973).
3. See notes 105-29 infra.
4. See note 116 infra.
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As the Rule remains, so do the uncertainties surrounding it. One
source of uncertainty is the "measuring ,life"-the term that describes
part of the period of the Rule. This Note will attempt to dispel this
uncertainty by examining several aspects of the concept of the measur-
ing life.5 In order to show how and why human life was chosen as
the primary measure of the period of the Rule, Part I will recount the
historical development of the measuring life concept as part of the
Rule. Part II will define several relevant terms in an attempt to clear
up a semantic confusion that has long hindered understanding of the
measuring life concept. Parts BI and IV will describe the class of enti-
ties whom draftsmen may make measuring lives in distributions. Part
V will suggest a framework to be used by constructionists in identify-
ing the measuring life, if any, in distributions." Part VI will discuss
law revisionists' reforms of the common law Rule that effect the meas-
uring 'life concept, and Part VII will forecast the concept's future in
the law of property.
I. ThE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEASURING
LIFE CONCEPT
The need to limit property owners' dead hand7 control over 'their
property existed long before the Rule Against Perpetuities was devel-
5. The term "measuring life concept" refers to the idea of measuring the permissi-
ble period of postponement of vesting of a contingent interest by the duration of a hu-
man life, and the body of rules that regulate that practice.
6. Defining the class of persons who may be measuring lives is a problem of law.
Specifying the measuring life in a particular distribution is a problem of construction,
one of furthering the transferor's intent. In the latter instance, it must be remembered
that
"In many cases the court is ascertaining not what the [testator] actually in-
tended in regard to a particular matter but what he would have intended if he
had thought about the matter." 2 Scott, Trusts, s. 164.1, p. 831. If the testa-
trix did not think about the matter, it is difficult to say that she had an intent
with respect to it. In that case the court is looking for a black hat in a dark
room; if the court locates it there at all, it will be on its own head and not
because of any light left by the last will and testament.
Roberts v. Tamworth, 96 N.H. 223, 225, 73 A.2d 119, 121 (1950) (brackets original).
This statement applies particularly to an area as fraught with arcane pitfalls as the Rule
Against Perpetuities. See note 2 supra.
7. At this point a word of explanation should be included concerning the use
of the term "dead hand". . . . The dead hand means the hand of the person
who is continuing to control the devolution of his property after he is dead,
either by the terms of his will or by some other instrument which effectuates
the same purpose. ...
Historically, however, the term dead hand referred to the hand of the donee,
not the donor. The dead hand was the religious or other corporation to whichhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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oped to serve that purpose." Throughout history, people have at-
tempted to prolong and even perpetuate their ownership, often from
fear of irresponsible future owners. An obvious way to do this is to
determine who will be the future owners and to limit their control.
Incentives peculiar to medieval England added to the natural in-
stincts of property owners to prolong their ownership. In 1285, Parlia-
ment passed the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus, 9 which permitted
the creation of a form of future interest called the fee tail.1" Persons
who wanted to control their property posthumously often used fees tail
because they were not reachable by creditors or subject to forfeiture
for treason or attainder for felony." Fees tail were disfavored by
courts precisely because of their potentially perpetual nature.' 2 The
Statute of Uses (1536) 13 and the Statute of Wills (1540)'4 created new
types of future interests, called executory interests, which permitted le-
gal estates "to arise in a designated person upon the happening of a
stated event . . . [or] to shift from one person to another upon the
happening of an event . . . ,,'l Soon thereafter landowners at-
tempted to
land had been given. In England, beginning as early as the thirteenth century,
there were enacted so-called mortmain statutes,-laws which prohibited the
holding of land by religious corporations. . . . Lord Coke. . .said that"...
the lands were said to come to dead hands as to their lords, for that by aliena-
tion in mortmain they lost wholly their escheats, and in effect their knight-
service for the defence of the realme, wards, marriages, reliefes, and the like;
and therefore was called a dead hand, for that a dead hand yieldeth no serv-
ice."
L. SIMs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 2-3 (1955) (footnotes omitted). See
also R. LYNN, supra note 2, at 10; R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 250; cf. W. LEACH, PROP-
ERTY LAW INDICTED! 92 (1967).
8. See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
9. Statute of Westminster, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285).
10. A fee tail is a transfer of property restricting ownership to the donee and his
lineal descendants. W. BuRBY, REAL PROPERTY § 2, at 6, § 89, at 203-04 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as BURBY]; L. SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 5, at 8 (2d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as SIMEs]. Future interests in property could be created before 1285,
but they were not nearly as effective as the fee tail for tying up property into the remote
future. BuRBY § 89. at 203; C. MOYNmAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 37-38 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MOYNImAN]; SimEs § 5, at 8.
11. MOYNMAN 39; Barry, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REv. 538, 539
(1937); cf. BuPBY § 89, at 204.
12. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *116; BunBY § 89, at 204; MOYNmAN
39. Almost 200 years later, it was held that a fee tail could be converted into a fee
simple. Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, Mich. term., pl. 25 (1472).
13. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536).
14. 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540).
15. BuRBY § 7, at 11. See also SIMES § 5, at 11-12.
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bring more and more land under their family settlements and to extend
-those settlements indefinitely into the future so that the land could never
be reached by creditors or split up for more efficient use according to
the needs of a growing population turning increasingly to industrial
pursuits. 16
Remedial legislation was proposed, but never adopted.17
During this period, courts used several standards to decide whether
the vesting' of a future interest was unlawfully postponed: ,the num-
ber of contingent interests involved,' 9 the nature of the contingency,2 0
and the interest's "tendency to a perpetuity."'" The most often used
and reliable standard was the duration of a contingent interest, meas-
ured in terms of human lives.2 2  In Love v. Wyndham (1670),"3 Jus-
tice Twsiden explained ,the human life standard as follows:
If a tenant of a -term devise it to B. for life, the remainder to C. for
life, the remainder to D. for life; I have 'heard it questioned, whether
these remainders are good or not? But it 'hath been held, that if all
the remainder-men are 'living at the time of the devise, it is good: if
all the candles be light at once it is good. But if you limit a remainder
to a person not in being, as to the first-begotten son, &c. and the like,
there would be no end if such limitations were admitted, and therefore
they are void .... 24
In 1682, the Duke of Norfolk's Case2 5 reconciled the different stand-
ards for the permissible duration of a contingent interest. In an ex-
haustive and well-reasoned opinion, Lord Chancellor Nottingham set
16. Leach, A Proposed Statute, 92 T. & E. 769 (1953). See also Barry, supra note
11, at 541.
17. Holdsworth, An Elizabethan Bill Against Perpetuities, 35 L.Q. REv. 258 (1919).
18. The essence of the vested remainder is that, throughout its continuance, it
is ready to take effect as a present interest however and whenever the preced-
ing estate terminates. On the other hand, the contingent remainder is a re-
mainder subject to a condition precedent. That is to say, there is a condition
precedent, other than the termination of the prior estate, which must occur be-
fore it is ready to take effect as a present interest.
SIMES § 11, at 20. See also MoYNmAN 123-24.
19. Massenburgh v. Ash, 23 Eng. Rep. 437 (Ch. 1684).
20. Child v. Bayle, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1618).
21. Apprice v. Fowler, 86 Eng. Rep. 501 (K.B. 1661); cf. Pearse v. Reeve, 86 Eng.
Rep. 501, 502 (K.B. 1661),
22. Love v. Wyndham, 86 Eng. Rep. 724, 726 (K.B. 1670); Goring v. Bickerstaffe,
86 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B. 1602). See also Gulliver v. Wickett, 95 Eng. Rep. 517, 518
(K.B. 1745).
23. 86 Eng. Rep. 724 (K.B. 1670).
24. Id. at 726.
25. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (C.A. 1683), rev'd, 22
Eng. Rep. 963 (H.L. 1685).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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the period at the length of a human life plus an unspecified period of
time after it.26  The decision was affirmed by the House of Lords in
1685,27 and has been recognized ever since as the foundation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
Although the Duke of Norfolk's Case established one human life
plus an unspecified length of time thereafter as the period during which
the vesting of a future interest could be postponed, it left in doubt the
permissible number of persons from whom the one life could be
chosen. While it could be argued that Love v. Wyndham2 s had de-
cided that any number could be used, the point continued to be liti-
gated into the eighteenth century." It was finally settled in Low v.
Burron (1734), ° where a contingent remainder after three life estates
was held good on the Love v. Wyndham rationale:
[]ere can be no danger of a perpetuity; for all these estates will de-
termine on the expiration of the three lives. So, if instead of three,
there had been twenty lives, . . . all the candles lighted up at once, it
would have been good; for, in effect, it is only for one life, viz. that
which shall happen to be the survivor.31
26. Id. at 960.
27. 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (H.L. 1685).
28. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
29. Almost all subsequent cases on point are in accord with Love v. Wyndham. In
1697 the House of Lords upheld a contingent remainder measured by two lives, albeit
with no statement of the rationale, Lloyd v. Carew, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H.L. 1697), while
two years later there was dictum that "let the lives be never so many, there must be
a survivor, and so it is but . . . that life .... " Scatterwood v. Edge, 91 Eng. Rep.
203 (K.B. 1699).
However, the report of a 1697 King's Bench decision has been interpreted as attribut-
ing to Chief Justice Treby the opinion that no more than one life could be used: "Treby
Chief Justice . . . was of the opinion, that the time allowed for executory devises to
take effect ought not to be longer than the life of one person then in esse. . . ." Lud-
dington v. Kime, 91 Eng. Rep. 1031, 1034 (K.B. 1697). (For purposes of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, executory interests are the same as contingent interests. L. SImus
& A. SMrrH, LAW OF FUTuRE INTERESTS § 1213, at 96-98 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as SrxEs & SMrrH]). According to Professor Gray, the Chief Justice was discuss-
ing the permissible number of lives, J. GRAY, TrE RULE AGAINST PmtPETurrms § 189
(4th ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as GuAY], but the rest of the report indicates that he
was merely referring to the period of the Rule. See generally Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo.
40, 54-56, 45 P. 391, 396-97 (1890).
For cases involving only one life, see Long v. Blackall, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 877-78
(K.B. 1797) (one life and one pregnancy); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 26 Eng. Rep. 365, 375
(Ch. 1738) (one life); Stephens v. Stephens, 25 Eng. Rep. 751, 752 (Ch. 1736) (one
life and twenty-one years).
30. 24 Eng. Rep. 1055 (Ch. 1734).
31. Id. at 1056.
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The usefulness of numerous lives for prolonging the duration of a
contingent interest was soon realized.12  In 1798, in Thellusson v.
Woodford,3 the courts were confronted by a contingent interest whose
duration was measured by nine lives, all young persons, none of
whom were beneficiaries, chosen in part for their family's reputation
for longevity. The House of Lords, however, saw nothing unlawful in
their number:
It appears then, that the. . . lives. . . are not confined to any definite
number. But it is asked, shall lands be rendered unalienable during the
lives of all the individuals, who compose very large societies or bodies
of men, or where other very extensive descriptions are made use of?
* . . [W]hen such cases occur, they will. . . be put to the usual test,
whether they will or will not tend -to .a perpetuity, by rendering it almost,
if not quite, impracticable to ascertain the extinction of the lives de-
scribed; and will be supported or avoided accordingly. 4
In 1833, 'the House of Lords upheld a contingent interest whose dura-
tion was measured by twenty-eight lives without discussing their num-
ber."
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the permissible period
for the duration of a contingent interest had been fixed at one life and
twenty-one years.8 6 The number and nature of contingencies involved
had been rejected 'as measures. These results fitted well into the struc-
ture of the common law of property, which was and still is primarily
on a plane of time. The duration of interests would be more predict-
able today if the early cases 'had set the period at a fixed number of
32. On the effectiveness of this technique, see note 106 infra.
33. 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805), affg 31 Eng. Rep. 1,17 (Ch. 1798).
34. Id. at 1040. The suggestion that the use of extraneous lives should be forbidden
was similarly rejected:
But it is contended, that in these and other cases the persons, during whose
lives the suspension was to continue, were persons immediately connected with
or immediately leading to the person, in whom the property was first to vest
I am unable to find any authority for considering this as a sine qua
non in the creation of a good executory trust. . . . inhere seems to be no
ground or principle, that renders such an ingredient necessary. The principle
is the avoiding of a public evil by placing property for too great a length of
time out of commerce. The length of time will not be greater or less, whether
the lives taken have any interest, . . nor, whether the lives are those of per-
sons immediately connected with or immediately leading to that person, in
whom the property is first to vest ....
Id.
35. Cadell v. Palmer, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
36. The development of the twenty-one year period is described in GRAY §§ 176-




years as do a few modem statutes. 37  This did not and probably will
not occur because the objects of property owners' generosity will be
other persons, whose interests are best served if the principal measure
is human life.
During the remainder of the nineteenth century, the other parts of
what came to be known as the Rule Against Perpetuities were formu-
lated."8 As stated by Professor John Chipman Gray, the common law
Rule is that no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest. 9 The term "vest" is used in the sense of vesting in interest,
not in possession.40  Generally, the Rule applies to all contingent fu-
ture interests. 41 The period of the Rule begins to run when the instru-
ment creating the interest takes effect: on delivery in the case of a
deed,42 at the testator's death in the case of a will, 43 at the creation
of a special power of appointment,44 or (according to the majority of
cases) a general power to appoint by will only,45 and at the exercise
of a general power presently exercisable.46 If, at the time the period
begins to run, there is any possibility that vesting or failure will not oc-
cur within the period of the Rule, the Rule is violated and the interest
fails. 47 The Rule is one of several in the law of property that prevent
dead hand control of property from continuing indefinitely. 48 Specif-
37. See note 115 infra.
38. The definitive history of the Rule's development is GRAY H0 123-69. See also
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 2123-29 (1940) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; Note,
Rule Against Perpetuities-Development in England, 23 GEO. L.. 105, 109-14 (1934).
39. ButBY § 184; GRAY 08 279-303.3; RESTATEMENT 80 370, 374; SIMES § 127;
SIMES & SMrrH § 1222.
40. BunBY § 187, at 419; Simms § 127, at 264; SIMms & SMrrI § 1223. On the
different meanings of the term "vested," see W. LEAcH & J. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT
ON FuTuRE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 253-54 (1961) [hereinafter cited as LEACH
& LOGAN]; Becker, Future Interests and the Myth of the Simple Will: An Approach
to Estate Planning-Part One, 1972 WASm U.L.Q. 607, 624-30.
41. BuRBY § 187; RESTATE ENT § 370, comment g at 2145; SImEs § 132; SimS
& SmrrH H8 1235-48.
42. Buany § 185, at 415; GRAY § 231; Simms § 127, at 267; SIMES & SmITH § 1226.
43. BURBY § 185, at 415; SiMEs § 127, at 267; SIMES & SMnH § 1226.
44. BuRny § 190, at 425; GRAY § 525; SIMES § 135, at 294; Simms & SMrm § 1251.
45. BunBY § 190, at 425; GRAY § 526; SIMES § 135, at 295; SiMES & SMITH § 1275.
According to the minority view, the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities begins to
run at the exercise of a general power to appoint by will only. ButaY § 190, at 425;
GRAY H0 526-26.3; SIMEs § 135, at 295; SIMES & SM1rH § 1275.
46. BuRBy § 190, at 425; GRAY § 524; SIMEs § 135, at 295; SIMES & SMrrH § 1251.
47. GRAY § 214; SIMES § 127, at 264; id. § 133; SIMES & SMrr § 1228.
48. GRAY § 268; Simms & SMm § 1222, at 106 ("[I-t is conceded by all authorities
Vol. 1974:265] 271
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ically, it strikes down one type of unconscionable dead hand control,
the creation of future interests which may vest beyond its period.40
When viewed in the context of its historical development, the Rule
Against Perpetuities makes sense.ce It was created out of a belief that
a free society must stop property owners from controlling -their prop-
erty for an unreasonably long time after they have parted with owner-
ship. Setting that limit at one human life and twenty-one years strikes
a -reasonable -balance among the interests of the donor, the donee, and
society.
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS
Previous scholarship has not distinguished between "lives in being"
and "measuring lives," 51 nor has it clearly defined either term. These
omissions are surprising and unfortunate, for the distinction between
* . . that, whatever may be the immediate objective of the rule against perpetuities, its
ultimate purpose is to prevent the tying up of property") (footnote omitted).
49. GRAY § 1; SIMEs § 120. The Rule is not directed at interests that last too long,
at restraints on alienation, or at the suspension of the power of alienation for too long.
GRAY § 2; SiMmS § 120.
50. The measuring life concept and the property law of which it is part cannot be
expected to make sense in a purely logical context. Justice Cardozo thought of the
law of real property as the "readiest example" of
those fields where there can be no progress without history. . . . No lawgiver
meditating a code of laws conceived the system of feudal tenures. History built
up the system and the law went with it Never by a process of logical deduc-
tion from the idea of abstract ownership could we distinguish the incidents of
an estate in fee simple from those of an estate for life, or those of an estate
for life from those of an estate for years. Upon these points, "a page of his-
tory is worth a volume of logic" [quoting Justice Holmes in New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)] . . . . I do not mean that even in
this field the method of philosophy plays no part at all. Some of -the concep-
tions of the land law, once fixed, are pushed to their logical conclusions with
inexorable severity. The point is rather that the conceptions themselves have
come to us from without and not from within, that they embody the thought,
not so much of the present as of the past, that separated from the past their
form and meaning are unintelligible and arbitrary, and hence that -their devel-
opment, in order to be truly logical, must be mindful of their origins.
B. CARDozo, TEI NATURE OF THE JUDICIL PRocEss 54-55 (1921) (footnotes omitted).
51. Professors Leach and Simes use the terms interchangeably. Compare Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HAv. L. REV. 638, 641 (1938), with SIMms & SMiTr
§ 1223. Professor Lynn prefers "measuring lives," see Lynn, Reforming the Rule
Against Perpetuities; Choosing the Measuring Lives, 1965 DuE L.J. 720, while Profes-
sor Gray and two leading Commonwealth authorities speak exclusively in terms of "lives
in being." Compare GRAY with Allan, Perpetuities: Who are the Lives in Being?, 81
L.Q. REv. 106 (1965) and Kiralfy, A "Life in Being" for the Purposes of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 6 CONVEY. 191 (1942).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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their meanings is crucial to an understanding of the measuring life con-
cept.
The measuring life concept involves three types of lives. First are
all the persons in the world when the period of the Rule begins to run
for a contingent interest in a distribution. They are the "lives in be-
ing." Second are those lives in being who, by the scheme of the dis-
tribution, have some causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the
contingent interest. They will be referred to as the "causal lives." In
almost all cases, the causal lives will be persons in the family of the
holder of the interest, holders of other interests in the distribution, or
persons specifically named in the distribution as the persons by whose
lives the duration of the contingency is to be measured. However, the
causal lives need not be mentioned in the distribution. Note also that
although the causal lives relate to the vesting or failure of the interest,
they do not guarantee that the vesting or failure win occur within the
period of the Rule. Thus, the fact that there are causal lives for -the
interest does not mean that the interest does not violate the Rule. The
causal lives may cause vesting or failure beyond the period of the Rule.
In most cases, though, one of the causal lives, by the terms of the distri-
bution, does guarantee vesting or failure within the period of the Rule.
Tlat causal life is the "measuring life" (one might say "validating
life") for the contingent interest. The existence of a measuring life
for the contingent interest means that the interest does not violate the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Thus, the term "measuring life" refers only
-to that person who, by the terms of the distribution, guarantees that
the contingent interest will vest or fail within twenty-one years of his
death. Where there is a class of causal lives, all of whom make vesting
or failure certain to occur within the period of the Rule, they will be
referred to as the "measuring lives."
I. WHO MAY BE A MEASURING LIFE?
The life that measures the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities
must be that of a human being.5 While the measuring lives for all
but the most unusual contingent interests will be human beings, occa-
sional attempts are made to include other entities in the class of poten-
tial measuring lives.
52. In re Kelly, [19321 Ir. R. 255, 260-61 (High Ct. of Justice); Smsas & SMrrH
1 1223. See also cases cited notes 58, 61 infra.
Vol. 1974:265] 273
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Fetuses
A fetus is considered to be a life in being, and thus may be a meas-
Uring life,53 presumably from the moment of conception and regardless
of later miscarriage or stillbirth. 54 If the measuring life must be of a
particular sex, as in a devise for which the measuring lives are "the
sons of A," and the 'testator dies while A is pregnant, arguably the fetus
cannot be a measuring life if its sex is 'not discoverable until birth.
Since it is not known to be a boy when the testator dies, vesting or
failure within the period of the Rule cannot be certain to occur as of
the time when the period begins to run. In the only reported case on
the subject, decided before pre-natal identification was possible, the
court violated the requirement of initial certainty of vesting or failure
and held that facts known as of the infant's birth would be referred
back to the testator's death.55 Since a boy was born, the Rule was not
violated. The court could have reached the same result and spared
the requirement of initial certainty of vesting or failure if, in applying
the Rule, it had considered all facts, known and unknown, at the testa-
tor's death, one of which was the fetus' male sex.
Animals
Testators occasionally create 'trusts for the care of their pets or farm
53. Riggs Nat'1 Bank v. Summerlin, 300 F. Supp. 1000, 1001 (D.D.C. 1969); Equit-
able Trust Co. v. McComb, 19 Del. Ch. 387, 394, 168 A. 203, 205 (1933); Marks v.
Southern Trust Co., 203 Tenn. 200, 209-10, 310 S.W.2d 435, 439-40 (1958); Thellusson
v. Woodford, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1042-43 (H.L. 1805); In re Wilmer's Trusts, [1903]
1 Ch. 874, 888; Long v. Blackall, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 877-78 (K.B. 1797). Another
way of stating this is that if a pregnancy actually occurs, its duration may be added to
the period of the Rule. GRAY §§ 220-22; RESTATEMENT § 374(c); SIMES & SMITH
§ 1224.
54. It has been proposed that the Rule should be amended to take account of the
existence of sperm banks, which can indefinitely preserve sperm beyond a man's death.
The proponents' theory is that a father's testamentary gift "to my children" would vio-
late the Rule in its common law form because the father's sperm, if frozen, could be
revived after twenty-one years after all persons alive at his death have died. The solu-
tion proposed is the redefinition of "the duration of a male life in being" to include "the
period of his reproductive capacity, including any post-mortem period during which his
sperm remains fertile." Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and
the Fertile Descendant, 48 A.B.AJ. 942, 944 (1962). The problem is actually not as
great as it may seem. Few men have sperm frozen when they die, and the word "child-
ren" in a will does not include illegitimates, according to the majority rule of construc-
tion. See LEACH & LOrAN 351; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 733-34 n.25 (1952). See generally Schuyler,
The New Biology and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 420 (1968).
55. In re Wilmer's Trusts, [1903] 1 Ch. 874.
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animals. In the only such reported case in which the pets' life estate
was followed by a contingent remainder, the High Court of Justice of
Ireland held that animals are not lives in being and invalidated the
trust.58 The court seemed to fear that if animals were allowed to be
measuring lives the same mentality that caused testators to specify
healthy babies as measuring lives would prompt them ,to use long-lived
animals for the same purpose." Other courts, when confronted with
bequests to animals, have usually reached the same result 8 without
considering upholding them on narrower grounds. For example, if the
fund for the animal is certain to be exhausted within twenty-one years,
the bequest should be unobjectionable as a perpetuity.5 9 Also, the
56. In re Kelly, [1932] Ir. R. 255 (High Ct. of Justice), noted in 46 HAnv. L.
REv. 1036 (1933).
57. The Irish High Court of Justice stated:
[11f the lives of the dogs or other animals could be taken into account in
reconing the maximum period of "lives in being and twenty-one years after-
wards" any contingent or executory interest might be properly limited, so as
only to vest within the lives of specified carp, tortoises, or other animals that
might live for over a hundred years, and for twenty-one years afterwards,
which, of course, is absurd. "Lives" means human lives. It was suggested that
the last of the dogs could in fact not outlive the testator by more than twenty-
one years. I know nothing of that. The Court does not enter into the ques-
tion of a dog's expectation of life. In point of fact neighbor's dogs and cats
are unpleasantly long-lived; but I have no knowledge of their precise expecta-
tion of life. Anyway the maximum period is exceeded by the lives even of
specified butterflies and twenty-one years afterwards. And even, according to
my decision-and, I confess, it displays this weakness on being pressed to a
logical conclusion-the expiration of the life of a single butterfly, even without
the twenty-one years, would be too remote, despite all the world of poetry that
may be thereby destroyed.
Id. at 260-61.
58. Estate of McNeill, 230 Cal. App. 2d 449, 451, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141 (1964);
In re Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 563-65, 260 N.Y.S. 598, 604-07 (King's County Sur. Ct.
1932). In the latter case, a contingent remainder to vest on the deaths of two cats and
three dogs was held to violate a statute limiting the permissible number of lives to two.
In dictum, the court stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that such domestic animals frequently live
to ages of ten or beyond, and it would be absurd to assert that any measuring
life which might extend for a period of ten years beyond the death of the testa-
tor, or even for an appreciable fraction thereof, was an inconsequential limi-
tation.
Id. at 563, 260 N.Y.S. at 605. But see Biscoe v. Biscoe, 19 Gill & Johns. 155, 160 (Md.
1834) (slave can be measuring life); cf. Williams v. Ash, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 1, 13-14
(1843) (same) (dictum) (by implication).
59. In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 425, 95 N.E.2d 779, 783 (1950)
(alternative holding); cf. In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552, 555 (1889) (upholding without
discussion of the Rule Against Perpetuities a bequest in trust for the testator's horses,
ponies, and hounds for a term of up to fifty years, despite plaintiff's argunent that the
gift was "void, as tending to a perpetuity; it depends on the lives not of human beings;
275
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types of animals that may be measuring lives could be limited to domes-
tic and farm animals, which would cover all the reported cases while
preventing the use of long-lived animals solely to prolong the postpone-
ment of vesting. 0 Problems in defining "domestic and farm animals"
are probably not insuperable.
Corporations
In the only reported case on point, it was decided that a corporation
is not a life in being and therefbre cannot be a measuring life,01 pre-
sumably because of its potentially infinite duration.
IV. How MANY MEASURING LIVES MAY BE USED?
Modem courts, following the early cases,62 place no specific limit on
the number of measuring lives that may be used.63  Interests with over
forty measuring lives in the United States64 and over 120 in England 5
have been upheld. However, the number of measuring lives must be
small enough so that the lives can all be ascertained"0 at the beginning
of the period of the Rule. Otherwise, it will be impossible to keep
track of the lives and know when the last has died; in that case, it will
be impossible to say when the -twenty-one year period has begun to
run and when the period of the Rule has expired. Therefore, if the
measuring lives are so numerous that they cannot all be ascertained
at the beginning of the period of the Rule, the interest the duration
but of animals"). The Dean decision is criticized as a violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities in Gray, Gifts. for a Non-charitable Purpose, 15 HARV. L. REv. 509, 530
(1902).
60. See generally Note, Validity of Trusts in Favor of Animals, 42 YALE L.J. 1290
(1933).
61. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 334 (1908).
62. See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
63. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Shellaberger, 399 Ill. 320, 333, 77 N.E.2d 675,
683 (1948); Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 406, 58 S.W.2d 448, 450 (1933);
First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, 73 N.E.2d 388, 394 (Ohio C.P. 1947); Warren's Es-
tate, 320 Pa. 112, 113, 182 A. 396, 397 (1936) (dictum); Robers v. Chisum, 238 S.W.
2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); cf. Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 201-02, 117 So.
887, 889 (1928). The argument that no more than one life could be used was pressed
and rejected in Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 54-56, 45 P. 391, 396-97 (1890).
64. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 334 (1908).
65. In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A. 1928), affg [1928] Ch. 471; Re Lever-
hume, [1943] 2 All E.R. 274 (Ch.).
66. "Ascertaining" the measuring lives means identifying and locating each of them.
See SMS § 127, at 266; Simms & SMrrH § 1223, at 100.
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of whose contingency they measure is void for uncertainty. 67 In cases
where the measuring lives have been named in the instrument in ques-
tion, ascertainment has been held to be no problem, regardless of the
numbers involved.6" This result could be criticized on the ground that
one of the group could become unascertainable during the period of
the Rule, thus making ascertainment impossible.69 On the other hand,
this criticism might prove too much, because future unascertainability
is also possible where there is only one measuring life.
How difficult ascertainment of a large class of lives must be for a
court to hold an interest void for uncertainty is not clear. The English
67. In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243, 250-51 (C.A. 1928); Re Leverhume, [1943] 2
All E.R. 274, 278 (Ch.); cf. State v. McGhee, 200 Iowa 329, 332-33, 204 N.W. 408,
409-10 (1925) (conveyance to "each and every member of the American Legion of
Iowa, each and every member of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows of Iowa, each
and every member of the Knights of Pythias of Iowa, and each and every attorney at
law in Iowa," totalling "several hundred thousand persons" held void for uncertainty);
In re Moore, [19011 1 Ch. 936, 938 (trust to continue "until the period of twenty-one
years from the death of the last survivor of all persons who shall be living at my death"
held void for uncertainty). But cf. In re Vaux, [1939] Ch. 465, 475 (C.A. 1938)
(dictum that testator could have made all persons alive in world measuring lives).
There is some authority for the proposition that if the measuring lives are so numer-
ous that they cannot all be ascertained, the interest they measure fails because it violates
the Rule Against Perpetuities, not because it is void for uncertainty. Thellusson v.
Woodford, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1034 (H.L. 1805), has been interpreted as including in
the common law Rule a requirement that the measuring lives not be too numerous. See
SIMES & SMITH § 1223, at 112. Also, according to the Restatement, see note 77 infra
and accompanying text, and California's statutory version of the common law Rule, CAL.
CIv. CODE § 715.2 (Deering 1971), part of the Rule is that the measuring lives must
not be "so numerous. . . or so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be un-
reasonably difficult to obtain." New York's statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, which
appears to follow the common law Rule, contains almost identical language. N.Y. EST.,
Powais & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967).
However, the only cases directly on point, Villar and Leverhume, adhered to the
void-for-uncertainty standard. They are definitely controlling in England, and prob-
ably in all Commonwealth jurisdictions. See Allan, supra note 51, at 107 (article by
Australian authority on future interests). There being no American cases on point, it
is not possible to say definitely what the law is here, but actual litigated cases, albeit
foreign, should carry more weight than the Restatement, a secondary source of little au-
thority. See W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINsT PERPETUTES § 24.1, at 8
(1957). "As a practical matter it would seem to make little difference what view is
adhered to." SiMEs & SMrrH § 1223, at 112.
68. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908) (over forty); Cadell v. Palmer, 6 Eng.
Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833) (twenty-eight).
69. Easily imaginable ways for this to occur would be for one of the measuring lives
to move far away, disappear, or die in obscurity. See text accompanying notes 72-73
infra.
277
Washington University Open Scholarship
278 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:265
courts seem to have followed the dictum in Thellusson v. Woodford70
that ascertainment would have to be "almost, if not quite, impracti-
cable" 71 to cause invalidity. Two leading cases applied this standard
to interests measured by the lives of the lineal descendants of Queen
Victoria living at the testators' deaths. 2 Both courts concluded that
"[t]here was great difficulty in ascertaining the descendants," of whom
there were "about 120,' '" but nevertheless upheld the trusts.74 In the
latter of the two cases, decided in 1943, the court cautioned against
the use of such a formula in contemporary interests, indicating that they
70. 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805). See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying
text.
71. 32 Eng. Rep. at 1040.
72. In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A. 1928), affg [19281 Ch. 471; Re Lever-
hume, [1943] 2 All E.R. 274 (Ch.). The deaths in both cases occurred in the 1920's.
73. There was great difficulty in ascertaining the descendants .... It ap-
peared, however . . . that in 1922 there were about 120 descendants who had
then to be sought in England, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
Spain, Greece, Jugo-Slavia and Rumania, and many of whom had probably
become scattered over the entire continent of Europe, and might even have
gone much further afield. It was not certain whether any of the late Tsaritsa's
children were living, and owing to the war many of the continental descendants
might fall into penury and obscurity, rendering any future tracing extremely
difficult, if not impossible. The expense of a strictly proved pedigree of the
descendants living at the testator's death would be very heavy.
In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243, 245 (C.A. 1928). In Re Leverhume, [1943] 2 All E.R.
274 (Ch.), the number was estimated at 134 and there was the additional problem of
the destruction of records in World War II. Id. at 277.
74. But it is said that the Courts ought to take into consideration the difficulty
that will arise in the future when, it may be 100 years hence, their successors
will be faced with the problem of finding out who is the last survivor of this
body of 120 or 130 persons and when he died. That is a difficulty which may
arise by reason of the vicissitudes of life, but it may not. It is possible that
120 years hence the Court may find a number of problems relating to the
births, marriages and deaths of various persons; but they appear to me to be
matters which we ought not to take into account. The difficulties are not in-
surmountable, and they may in fact never arise.
In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243, 249 (Lord Hanworth, M.R.). See also Re Leverhume,
[1943] 2 All E.R. 274, 281 (Ch.). In Muir v. Commissioners, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1269,
1282 (C.A.), the same rationale was used to defeat a claim that a class of beneficiaries
consisting in part of the next of kin and the past, present, and future husbands and wives
of the settlor's descendants who were alive at the settlement was void for uncertainty.
No reported case decides what happens if one of the measuring lives becomes unas-
certainable during the period of the Rule. The presumption of death that arises from
prolonged, unexplained absence, see C. McCoRMicx, LAw OF EVIDENCE § 343, at 809
(1972); Jalet, Mysterious Disappearance: The Presumption of Death and the Adminls-
tration of the Estates of Missing Persons or Absentees, 54 IoWA L. REV. 177 (1968),
would probably cause the missing measuring life to be considered dead after the period
appropriate under local law.
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would be held void for uncertainty. 75  In the earlier English cases on
point, courts voided interests for uncertainty only when ascertainment
of the measuring lives was totally impossible.76
There are no American cases directly on point, but the dicta and
commentators would require far easier ascertainment than do the Eng-
lish courts. According to the Restatement of Property (1940)77 and
California's statutory version of the common law Rule,78 the measuring
lives should be "neither so numerous [nor] so situated that evidence
of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain," and the
few relevant decisions are in accord.79 In applying this standard of
reasonable difficulty, the courts and commentators consider several
factors:
(1) the number of measuring lives-the larger their number, the
less reasonable the difficulty;80
75. Re Leverhume, [1943] 2 All E.R. 274, 280-81 (Ch.).
76. In re Moore, [1901] 1 Ch. 936 (all persons alive in world at testator's death);
In re Viscount Exmouth, 23 Ch. D. 158 (1883) (all the persons alive at Viscount Ex-
mouth's death who later attain his title). The latter case is explained in In re Lanyon,
[1927] 2 Ch. 264, 270:
The want of certainty in the operation of the limitation here in question was
this: The clause postponed the vesting of an absolute interest in chattels till
the expiration of a term of twenty-one years to commence from the decease
of all such persons as should be living at the testators death, and should at
any time after the testator's death attain the title of Exmouth. The result was
that you could never tell at any time who was entitled to the chattels, because
until all persons (and there were several) who were alive at the testator's death
and who might succeed to the title, were actually dead, you could never say
whether the term of twenty-one years had commenced to run, was still current,
had expired or had not commenced to run. The matter was one of absolute
impossibility.
77. RESTATEMENT § 374(a) (ii).
78. CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.2 (Deering 1971). New York's statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, which appears to follow the common law Rule, contains almost identical
language. N.Y. EsT., PowEns & TRUSTS LAw § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967).
79. Reagh v. Kelley, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1096, 89 Cal. Rptr. 425, 435 (1970);
In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 424, 95 N.E.2d 779, 783 (1950). Another
decision discusses the English standard with approval but does not adopt it. Ministers
& Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. McKay, 64 Misc. 2d 231, 253-56, 315 N.Y.S.2d 549, 572-
73 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1970). Reagh and McKay both concerned classes of "rela-
tives." It is unclear whether the courts in those cases, in holding that the classes were
ascertainable, meant that the classes were described clearly enough that their member-
ship could be determined, or that, in addition, all the members of the class could be
located. See note 66 supra.
80. RESTATEMENT § 374, comment I at 1480. The Restatement would void interests
measured by all the persons alive in the United States at a given moment or all the per-
sons listed in a given telephone book, but would uphold an interest measured by the lives
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(2) the obscurity of some or all of the measuring lives-the greater
their obscurity, the more difficult it will be to keep track of
them, especially in time of war or social upheaval; 8'
(3) the relationship, if any, of the measuring lives to the donor and
donee 82-the closer the relationship, the more likely the donor
and donee are to keep track of the measuring lives for family
reasons;
(4) the financial interest, if any, of the measuring lives in the dis-
tribution in question-the greater their interest, the more likely
they are to make their whereabouts continually known; 3
(5) the size of the corpus out of which the costs of ascertainment
must be paid-the smaller the fund, the less reasonable the
difficulty of ascertainment.8 4
When the ascertainability of the measuring lives is judged by these
standards, the result should allow the donor enough dead hand control
to provide sensibly for the objects of his generosity, but should prevent
him from abusing -the Rule and unreasonably inconveniencing the
courts and donees.
Finally, it should be noted -that by the American standard, as by the
English,"5 the possibility that future events may make ascertainment of
of a small number of persons, no matter how difficult their ascertainment. Id. at 1480-
81.
81. Id. at 1480. The Restatement would void an interest measured by the lives of
the inhabitants of a given orphan asylum at a given moment. Id.
82. Id. at 1481-82; cf. Reagh v. Kelley, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1098, 89 Cal. Rptr.
425, 436 (1970) (class of beneficiaries consisting in part of "any relatives of dece-
dent, to the third degree, 'found living on the Continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa
within 20 years of the creation of this trust"' held ascertainable under statute adopting
Restatement standard); Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. McKay, 64 Misc. 2d 231,
256, 315 N.Y.S.2d 549, 573 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1970) (dictum that class of meas-
uring lives consisting of persons related to testatrix and her husband within tenth degree
would be valid under common law Rule).
83. RESTATEmENT § 374, comment 1 at 1481. The Restatement would uphold an
interest creating inheritable annuities to accumulate for the lives of forty named persons
and to be distributed when the last of them dies. Id.; cf. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321
(1908).
84. SimEs & SmrrH § 1223, at 111; cf. State v. McGhee, 200 Iowa 329, 332-33,
204 N.W. 408, 409-10 (1925), in which the conveyance of a farm to several hundred
thousand persons was held void:
The expense of executing, acknowledging, and recording instruments of con-
veyance by the several hundred thousand persons indicated would many times
exceed the value of the farm, let alone the small interest actually possessed by
appellant [due to three mortgages on the farm] . . . . The deed on its face
was void and conveyed no title whatever.
85. See note 74 supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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the measuring lives unreasonably difficult or impossible is immaterial
in deciding whether the interest in question is void for uncertainty. 6
The Rule Against Perpetuities' requirement of vesting or failure is like-
wise immaterial, because the issue is not whether the Rule itself is vio-
lated, but whether the class of measuring lives is so uncertain that the
Rule cannot be applied. Only after the initial problem, if any, of un-
certainty has been overcome, does the Rule itself operate.
V. How IS THE MEASURING LIFE IDENTIFIED?
In operation, the Rule Against Perpetuities requires that there be
some person, identifiable from the terms of the distribution in question,
alive at the creation of the interest in question, within twenty-one years
of whose death the interest must vest or fail. This person is the
measuring life for the interest. To determine that the interest does
not violate the Rule, a measuring life must be found for it.81
The measuring life need not be specified 8 or even mentioned in the
distribution.8 9 The donor need not intend any particular person to be
the measuring life.9° The measuring life need not be a relative of any
taker,91 or the holder of a previous estate9" or of any interest in the distri-
86. RESTATEMENT § 374, comment I at 1481.
87. See generally Allan, supra note 51, at 106-08; Kiralfy, supra note 51; Leach,
supra note 51, at 641-42.
88. For examples of wills in which measuring lives were specified, see Fitchie v.
Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Burdick v. Burdick, 33 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D.D.C. 1940),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942); Ramage v. First Farmer's & Merchant's Nat'1 Bank,
249 Ala. 240, 244-46, 30 So. 2d 706, 710-11 (1947); First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Collins, 114 N.J. Eq. 59, 60, 168 A. 275, 276 (1909); Marks v. Southern Trust
Co., 203 Tenn. 200, 211, 310 S.W.2d 435, 440 (1958).
89. B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 205, 89 N.E.2d 777, 779
(1950); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 362, 140 So. 2d 843, 848 (1962); Lux v. Lux,
109 R.I. 592, 598-99, 288 A.2d 701, 705 (1972); Sims v. McMullan, 22 S.W.2d 313,
318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1931); Betchard v. Iverson, 35 Wash. 2d 344, 355, 212 P.2d 783, 789 (1949). See also
cases cited note 101 infra.
90. Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 362, 140 So. 2d 843, 848 (1962); see note 6
supra.
91. McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 383 (1885); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356,
362, 140 So. 2d 843, 848 (1962); Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 598-99, 288 A.2d 701, 705
(1972); Roberts v. Chisum, 238 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). See also
cases cited notes 98, 99 infra.
92. Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Ky. 1957); B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v.
Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 205, 89 N.E.2d 777, 779 (1950); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356,
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bution. 3  In the vast majority of interests the measuring life must
be implied from the terms of the distribution in question. 4
There is no precise formula for implying the measuring life in a dis-
tribution. The basic question is whether there is some causal life, as-
certainable from the scheme of the distribution, of whom it can be said
"The interest in question must vest, if at all, during his life, at his death,
or within twenty-one years thereafter." If this question is asked about
each causal life in the distribution, the measuring life, if any,"5 will
eventually be identified. The element of trial and error in this process
can be reduced by picking out the causal lives of whom one is most
likely to be the measuring life. This is a skill that can be acquired
only by repeated practice with specific distributions. In the following
paragraphs, the Rule is phrased in a way that will point to the causal
lives and 'ultimately to the measuring life. Examples of frequently
used distributions are given and the Rule is applied to them, revealing
the measuring life.96
(1) Is there some person during whose life the interest in question
must vest or fail?
Examples: (a) in a gift or bequest to a person at some point
in his own life: From A to B if B reaches forty;
B is the measuring life for his own interest. 97
362, 149 So. 2d 843, .848 (1962); Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 598-99, 288 A.2d 701, 705
(1972); Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798), aird, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030
(H.L. 1805); cf. Alcoma Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 207 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y.
County Sup. Ct. 1960). See also cases cited notes 97, 98, 101 infra.
93. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Shellaberger, 399 Ill. 320, 333, 77 N.E.2d 675,
6&3 (1948); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 362, 140 So. 2d 843, 848 (1962); Friday's
Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 333, 170 A. 123, 125 (1933); Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 598-99,
288 A.2d 701, 705 (1972); Roberts v. Chisum, 238 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951); Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798), affd, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030
(ILL. 1,805); cf. In re Estate of Friedman, 67 Misc. 2d 304, 323 N.Y.S.2d 499 (West-
chester County Sur. Ct. 1971); Alcoma Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 207
N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1960). See also cases cited notes 98, 101 infra.
94. See, e.g., Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 362, 140 So. 2d 843, 848 (1962); In
re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App. 417, 424-25, 95 N.E.2d 779, 783 (1950); Sims v.
l cMullan, 22 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 S.W.
2d 141 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931); Betchard v. Iverson, 35 Wash. 2d 344, 355, 212 P.2d
783, 789 (1949).
95. If there is no measuring life for an interest, then the interest violates the Rule.
96. For a similarly structured treatment of English cases, see Kiralfy, supra note
51.
97. Breault v. Feigenholtz, 250 F. Supp. 551, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d
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(b) in a gift or bequest to a person at some point
in another person's life: From A to B if C
reaches forty; C is the measuring life for B's in-
terest.9 8
(c) in a gift or bequest to a person upon the occur-
rence of a condition subsequent divesting an-
other person's life estate: From A to B for life,
but if B changes his name, then to C; B is the
measuring life for C's interest.99
(2) Is there some person at whose death the interest in question
must vest or fail?
Example: (a) in a gift or bequest to a person after the termi-
nation of a life interest in another person: From
A to B for life, then to C if he survives B; B
is the measuring life for C's interest. 0
39, 45 (7th Cir. 1966) (power of appointment exercised in favor of person alive at its
creation; that person is the measuring life for his own interest); Estate of Bird, 225 Cal.
App. 2d 196, 199, 37 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1964) (same); First-Central Trust Co. v.
Claflin, 73 N.E.2d 388, 394 (Ohio C.P. 1947) (same); Sims v. MeMullan, 22 S.W.2d
313, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1931) (A to B for life if it ever becomes necessary for his support; B is the meas-
uring life for his own interest); White v. National Bank & Trust Co., 212 Va. 568, 570,
186 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1972).
98. Betchard v. Iverson, 35 Wash. 2d 344, 212 P.2d 783 (1949).
99. See Friday's Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 A. 123 (1933) (A to B when A's grand-
children living at A's death die; A's grandchildren living at A's death are the measuring
lives for B's interest); cf. In re Lanyon, [1927] 2 Ch. 264 (A to B for life, then to
B's children if B has not married a blood relation; B is the measuring life for B's child-
ren's interests).
100. American Security & Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.D.C.
1959) (A to B for life, then to B's children; B is the measuring life for his children's
interests); Dorrance v. Dorrance, 238 F. 524, 526 (3d Cir. 1916), a!f'd on rehearing,
238 F. 924 (3d Cir. 1917) (per curiam) (A to B for life, then to B's children if there
are any, and if not, then to C, D, E, and F; B is the measuring life for the interests
of B's children, C, D, E, and F); In re Plaut's Estate, 158 P.2d 745, 747 (Cal. App.),
aft'd, 27 Cal. 2d 424, 164 P.2d 765 (1945) (en banc) (A to B for life, then to B's child-
ren when they reach twenty-one; B is the measuring life for B's children's interests);
In re Estate of Harrison, 22 Cal. App. 2d 29, 34-36, 70 P.2d 522, 525-26 (1937)
(same); Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 50-51, 45 P. 391, 395 (1896) (same as Cramer);
Hooker v. Hooker, 130 Conn. 41, 56, 32 A.2d 68, 75 (1943); Van Roy v. Hoover, 96
Fla. 194, 202, 117 So. 887, 889 (1928); In re Estate of McCune, 214 So. 2d 56, 58
(Fla. App. 1968) (A to B and C for life, then to their widows if they are alive then;
B and C are the measuring lives for their wives' interests); Jossey v. Brown, 119 Ga.
758, 763, 47 S.E. 350, 353 (1904) (A to B for life, and if B's children do not reach
twenty-one, then to B's husband; B is the measuring life for her husband's interest);
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(3) Is there some person at whose death or within twenty-one years
thereafter the interest in question must vest or fail?
Examples: (a) in a bequest to a person's grandchildren when
they reach twenty-one: From A to A's grand,
children when they reach twenty-one; A's chil-
dren are the measuring lives for A's grandchil-
dren's interests.' 0'
(b) in a gift or bequest to the person chosen by the
donee of a special power of appointment or a
general power to appoint by will: A exercises
a general power to appoint by will in favor of
B; A is the measuring life for B's interest.' 0 2
(c) in a gift or bequest to named persons for their
lives, then to their children "for as long as the
Chism v. Reese, 190 Md. 311, 323, 58 A.2d 643, 648 (1948) (A to B for life, and if
B dies without children, then to the children of C; B is the measuring life for C's child-
ren's interests); Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 378, 78 N.E. 422, 427 (1906); In
re Dingier's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 193, 29 N.W.2d 108, 110 (1947) (same as Cramer);
Paton v. Langley, 50 Mich. 428, 433, 15 N.W. 537, 539 (1883) (A to B for life, then
to C for life, then to B's heirs living at his death; B and C are the measuring lives for
B's heirs' interests); Peterson v. Peterson, 222 Minn. 208, 209-10, 23 N.W.2d 580, 581
(1946) (A to B for life, then to C for life, .then to their children then alive who have
refrained from drinking liquor for five years; B and C are the measuring lives for their
children's interests); Malone v. Herndon, 197 Okla. 26, 31, 168 P.2d 272, 277 (1945)
(A to B for life, and if he is survived by issue, then to them; B is the measuring life
for his issues interests); In re Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 448-49, 66 P.2d 88, 95-
96 (1937) (same as Malone); Roberts v. Chisum, 238 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) (A to B for life, and if B dies without heirs, then to the heirs of C; B is the
measuring life for C's heirs' interests).
101. McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340 (1885); Bates v. Spooner, 75 Conn. 501, 505-
06, 54 A. 305, 307 (1903) (A to A's grandchildren if necessary for their college edu-
cation (assuming that college education ends at age twenty-one); A's children are the
measuring lives for A's grandchildren's interests); Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W.2d 528, 529
(Ky. 1957) (dictum); Tuttle v. Steele, 281 Ky. 218, 224, 135 S.W.2d 436, 439 (1939)
(dictum); Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Second Bank-State Street Trust Co., 335
Mass. 407, 412, 140 N.E.2d 201, 206 (1957); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 356, 140 So.
2d 843 (1962); Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 288 A.2d 701 (1972); Otterback v. Bohrer,
87 Va. 548, 552, 12 S.E. 1013, 1014 (1891); Woodruff v. Pleasants, 81 Va. 37, 42
(1885).
102. Second Nat'l Bank v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 29 Conn. Supp. 275, 283 A.2d
226 (Super. Ct. 1971); West v. Storm, 71 Ill. App. 2d 245, 253, 217 N.E.2d 825, 828
(1966); Murphy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 236 Md. 282, 289, 203 A.2d
889, 893 (1964); Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 32 Ohio Misc. 81,
285 N.E.2d 768 (Mahoning County C.P. 1972); Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 120, 182
A. 396, 399 (1936); In re Estate of Lawrence, 136 Pa. 354, 364, 20 A. 521, 522 (1890);
In re Paul, [1921] 2 Ch. 1, 6.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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Rule Against Perpetuities allows": From A to
B and C for life, then to their children for as
long as the Rule Against Perpetuities allows; B
and C are the measuring lives for their chil-
dren's interests. 10 3
(d) in a gift or bequest to the person chosen by the
donee of a general power to appoint by will, who
was alive at the creation of the power but was
unknown to the donee at that time: A, donee
of a general power to appoint by will, exercises
the power in favor of B, his wife, for her life,
then to their surviving children; B was alive at
the creation of the power, but did not know A;
B is the measuring life for their children's inter-
ests.'
0 4
VI. THE EFFECT OF REFORMS OF THE COMMON LAW RULE
UPON THE CONCEPT OF THE MEASURING LIFE
The Rule Against Perpetuities has been criticized for allowing the
use of extraneous measuring lives, often in large numbers, for the sole
purpose of prolonging the postponement of vesting. 10 5 The fact that
the longest-lived of a group of fifty persons is not likely to live longer
than the longest-lived of a group of ten 0 6 has not stopped testators
103. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 331 (1908); Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303,
324, 126 S.E.2d 140, 156-57 (1962); In re Vaux, [1939] Ch. 465, 468, 475-76 (C.A.
1938); In re Moore, [1901] 1 Ch. 936, 937 (dictum); Pownall v. Graham, 55 Eng. Rep.
360, 362 (R.C. 1863). Contra, Farmers Nat'l Bank v. McKenney, 264 S.W.2d 881, 882
(Ky. 1954) (alternative holding).
104. Reed's Estate, 342 Pa. 54, 59, 19 A.2d 365, 367 (1941). Contra, In re Harvey,
39 Ch. D. 289, 297-98 (C.A. 1888) (remainders held void on possibility that A will
remarry to a woman not born at creation of power who will survive A, B, and all A's
and B's children). One court, faced with the same problem, construed the children's
remainders as vested at the death of A and B, with enjoyment postponed. Gray v.
Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 378, 78 N.E. 422, 427 (1906).
105. W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, supra note 67, at 52-53; 3 W. WALSH, COMMENTARniS
ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 430-31 (1947); Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legisla-
tion, 70 L.Q. REv. 478, 490 (1954).
106. The longer lived of two persons chosen at random at age five has a life expec-
tancy of 89 years; for the longest lived of five, the life expectancy is 92; for ten, it is
94; for twenty, 97; for fifty, 100; for 100, 102. These figures are based on 1971 Group
Annuity Mortality Tables and the following calculations. The data used was from
10,000 people alive at age five. Set n, = the number of people in the population alive
at age i. In this data n 110 = 0. Then for 5 -i _ 110, 10,000 - n, = the number of
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from choosing numerous lives in the hope of controlling their property
as long -as possible.' 07  As a result, legislation has been proposed to
restrict the number of lives that may be used or to require that the
lives be somehow related to the interest they measure. 08 Requiring
the measuring lives to have some stake in the distribution sounds like a
perfect solution, but can be evaded by giving the extraneous lives some
slight bequest to vest at the death of -the survivor."°  A set limit on
the number of lives that may be used invalidates distributions inadver-
tently drawn with more beneficiaries than permissible lives. New
York's century-long experience with such a rule has been called "an
enduring monument to the dangers of intemperate modification.""10
Some recent perpetuities statutes specify in prodigious detail who may
and who may not be measuring lives, in an attempt to narrow the com-
mon law concept just far enough to prevent the use of extraneous
people who die before age i; and P, = 10,000 - nt is the (empirical probability that
10,000
a randomly selected individual will die before age i. Thus (P,)m is the probability that
m (independently selected) individuals will all die before age i. Thus, (P1)m -(P1 1,)m is the probability that all m will die before age i, but at least one will live to
age i-1; that is, the probability that the longest living member of the group will die be-
tween ages i-I and i. In this case we take his age at death to be i-A. Therefore,
the average age at death (or life expectancy) of the longest living member of a ran-
domly selected group of m people (all alive at age five) is
110Y_ (i-2) [(Pi)M - (PI-.1m]
i=6
This calculation was made for the values m = 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100. See also Rus-
sell, Proposed Changes in the New York Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 ST. JoHN's L. Rv.
50, 59-60 (1931).
107. See notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text. The "royal lives" clauses up-
held in In re Villar, 11929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A. 1928), and Re Leverhume, [1943] 2 All
E.R. 274 (Ch.), were standard practice in England until recently. SIMES & SMITH §
1223, at 111 & n.86.
108. See authorities cited note 105 supra.
109. Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REv. 486, 488 (1964).
110. R. LYNN, supra note 2, at 181. The New York statute, codified at REv. STAT.
N.Y., Pt. I, .,h. I, tit. 2, art. 1, § 15 (real property), ch. IV, tit. 4, § 2 (personal prop-
,erty) (1830), repealed, chs. 152, 153 [1958] N.Y. Laws 169, 171, limited the permissible
number of measuring lives to two and was said to cause
uncertainty, technicality, destruction of wills by the hundred which in fairness
and justice should have been enforced... as well as the perplexity of bench
and bar alike ....
W. WAiSH, supra note 105, at 432. New York has since returned to what appears to
be the common law Rule. N.Y. EsT., Powns & TRuSTS LAw § 9-1.1 (McKinney
1967).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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lives.111 Inevitably, such codifications are either overbroad, 112 unrea-
sonably narrow,"13 or vague'" in parts. The most satisfactory solution
yet devised is to offer a long period of years, usually eighty, as an al-
ternative measure of the period of the Rule. Adopted in several juris-
dictions, 115 it will hopefully wean draftsmen away from "royal lives"
clauses and other complicated classes of measuring -lives.
The measuring life concept has also been affected by the adoption
in nine states of the wait-and-see doctrine.116 Born out of dissatisfac-
tion with the Rule's requirement of initial certainty of vesting or fail-
ure,117 the doctrine provides that the Rule's period be measured by
what actually happens rather than by what is possible when the interest
in question is created. For example, a devise from A to B for life,
then to B's children when the youngest reaches twenty-five is void at
common law because B might die leaving a child under four, which
would postpone vesting more than twenty-one years after the death of
111. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55, § 3 (4, 5); New Zealand Per-
petuities Act 1964, [1964] N.Z. Stat. c. 47, § 8 (4, 5); Ontario Perpetuities Act 1966,
[19661 Ont. Stat. c. 113, §§ 3-6.
112. Morris & Wade, supra note 109, at 502-05.
113. id. at 505-06.
114. Prichard, Two Petty Perpetuities Puzzles, 1969 CAmm. L.J. 284.
115. CAL. Cry. CODE § 715.6 (Deering 1971) (sixty years); Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations Act 1964, c. 55 § 1(2); New Zealand Perpetuities Act 1964, (1964] N.Z.
Stat. c. 47, § 6; Victoria Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1968 § 5(1); Western
Australia Law Reform Act (Property, Perpetuities & Succession), 1962, c. 83, § 5. See
also Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 965, 982 (1959).
116. The wait-and-see doctrine has been adopted by statute in eight states, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1969); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 11-103(a) (1969); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 184A, § 1 (1969); Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Anderson
1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104(b) (1972); VT. STAT. ANr . tit. 27, § 501 (1967);
and by decision in one state, Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 231-32, 97
A.2d 207, 212 (1953). Massachusetts was moving towards judicial adoption of wait-and-
see, Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952) (wait-and-see alternative
holding), but the legislature mooted the question by passing a wait-and-see statute at its
next session, [1954] Mass. Acts 637. Florida appeared to have adopted wait-and-see ju-
dicially, Story v. First Nat1 Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934), but
then reaffirmed the common law Rule, Cartinhour v. Houser, 66 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla.
1953).
American perpetuities statutes in force on April 1, 1967, are compiled in 2 REA
PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRusr J. 205-10 (1967). This compilation is updated in the
Journal's annual surveys of real property and trust and estate legislation. See 3 id. 75,
178 (1968); 5 id. 241, 333 (1970).
117. See Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952); Tudor, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the Rule
Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Rule, 34 B.U.L. REV. 129 (1954).
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B, the measuring life. n 8  Under the wait-and-see doctrine, however,
the interest would not be declared void ab initio. Rather, the courts
and interested parties would wait and see if, when B dies, he actually
has a child under four. If he does, A's limitation would be held 'to
violate the Rule; if he doesn't, the remainders to B's children actually
would vest within a life in being and twenty-one years, and the Rule
would not be violated. Wait-and-see's proponents would argue that
since the children's interests did vest within the period, they should be
just as acceptable as interests that were always certain to vest within
the period.
The effect of the wait-and-see doctrine on the measuring life concept
has been fiercely debated for twenty years. According to one interpre-
tation of the doctrine by its opponents, if actual events are to be consid-
ered, all the persons alive in the world at an interest's creation and
within twenty-one years of whose deaths the interest actually vests are
its measuring lives."' This argument is supported by the cases up-
holding trusts that are "to continue for as long as the law allows" by
implying measuring lives for them.'20 It is said that these cases show
courts' willingness to imply measuring lives in broadly worded distribu-
tions. Wait-and-see's proponents answer that this interpretation of the
doctrine is patently ridiculous and represents the kind of absurdly re-
morseless consistency that wait-and-see is supposed to prevent.121
They say that the all-inclusive theory would produce absurd results12 2
118. Bach v. Pace, 305 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Ky. 1957); In re Lattoufs Will, 87 NJ.
Super. 137, 208 A.2d 411 (Super. Ct. 1965); Appeal of Coggins, 124 Pa. 10, 16 A. 579
(1889).
119. Allan, supra note 51, at 108-09; Allan, The Rule Against Perpetuities Restated,
6 U.W. AusmL. L. REv. 27, 43-44 (1963); Jones, Measuring Lives Under the Pennsyl-
vania Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 54, 59-60 (1960);
Mechem, supra note 115, at 981-82; Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed',
52 Mic. L. REv. 179, 187 (1953); Simes, A Qualified Endorsement, 92 T. & E. 770,
771-72 (1953); Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN.
L. REv. 41, 65-66 (1957).
120. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
121. Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. LJ. 3,
62-63 (1960); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
1124, 1143 (1960).
122. Jones, supra note 119, at 60. By the all-inclusive theory, the measuring lives
for an interest are all the persons in the world who are alive at the creation of the inter-
est and within twenty-one years of whose deaths the interest actually vests. In the case
of an interest of short duration, there would be millions, if not billions, of measuring
lives. Such a class would be so large that the interest in question would be void for
uncertainty. See notes 62-67 supra. However, an interest of extremely long durationhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/3
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and that it changes the common law Rule so much that the legislatures
cannot be assumed to have intended it without saying so, which they
have not.'12 3
The proponents of wait-and-see argue that the legislature's discard-
ing of the requirement of initial certainty of vesting or failure does not
necessarily indicate any change in the common law method of choosing
the measuring lives, and that necessary implication from the terms of
the distribution remains the guiding principle.124 Retaining the com-
mon law method causes a reasonable result. If the vesting contingency
does occur within the period of the Rule, the distribution is not objec-
tionable as a perpetuity. 12' Against this interpretation it is said that
abandoning the requirement of initial certainty of vesting or failure is
so great a departure from the common law Rule that the legislatures
must have intended to change the measuring life concept, too.126
There is another, far more fundamental objection to the theory that
measuring lives under wait-and-see are the same as under the common
law Rule. At common law, to be a measuring life a person must vali-
date the distribution ab initio. If wait-and-see does not change the
class of measuring lives, then under wait-and-see, as at common law,
every distribution must be valid or void ab initio. Thus, under wait-
and-see, there is never any need to wait and see.' 2 7  Of course, this
argument is valid only if common law measuring lives are restricted to
those lives in being who will validate the distribution ab initio.
Whether or not this assumption is correct will probably never be settled,
because "at common law it does not seem to matter how one puts it
and therefore the problem has no practical significance and has never
would be saved by locating some previously unnoticed centenarian. These results would
not only frustrate the purposes of the common law Rule, they would promote opposite
purposes.
123. Leach, supra note 121, at 1144-45.
124. Id. See also Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Statute-New
Kernels from Old Nutshells, 28 TEMp. L.Q. 321, 332-36 (1955).
125. Morris & Wade, supra note 109, at 497-501.
126. Jones, supra note 119, at 63; 48 MIcH. L. REv. 1158, 1167-69 (1950).
127. Maudsley, Measuring Lives Under a System of Wait and See, 86 L.Q. REv. 357,
360-63 (1970). This circle of self-destruction is required by the plain language of
Western Australia Law Reform Act (Property, Perpetuities & Succession), 1962, c. 83,
§ 7(3):
Nothing in this section makes any person a life in being.., unless that person
would have been . . . a life in being . . . if this section had not been enacted.
See Allan, supra note 51, at 109-10; Allan, supra note 119, at 45 & n.52. Professor
Allan drafted the Western Australia statute.
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had to be answered directly.' 28
As a middle course between the narrow common law definition of
measuring lives and the overbroad all-inclusive theory, some supporters
of wait-and-see read into the doctrine a requirement that the measuring
lives have a causal connection to the vesting of the interest in ques-
tion.'29 By this standard, it is said:
In practically all cases the measuring lives will be one or more of the
following ... : (a) the preceding life tenant, (b) the taker(s) of the
interest, (c) a parent of ,the takers of the interest, (d) a person desig-
nated as a measuring life in the instrument, or (e) some other person
whose actions or death can expressly or by implication cause the interest
to vest or fail. 130
The causal connection theory does not make the common law causal
lives into wait-and-see measuring lives. Rather, it restricts the persons
about whom we are to wait and see to the common law causal lives.
Pearson Estate,'3' the only reported case which concerns measuring
lives decided under the wait-and-see doctrine appears ,to have followed
the causal connection theory, perhaps unconsciously, without encoun-
tering any of the problems foreseen by the theory's opponents. The
testator, a childless widower whose parents were dead, died survived
by six brothers and sisters, thirteen nephews and nieces, and twenty-
nine grand-nephews and grand-nieces. His will created a trust " ' for
his brothers and sisters for their lives, then to his nephews and nieces
128. Allan, supra note 119, at 45. See also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
Part II of this Note states that the measuring life must validate the distribution in
question ab initio, while the lives in being and causal lives need not do so. Part U is
not intended to be declaratory of the common law Rule as originally formulated. See
text accompanying note 39 supra. Rather, it is intended to distinguish between previ.
ously ambiguous terms in order to clarify the common law Rule and facilitate under-
standing of its operation.
129. Allan, supra note 51, at 109-10; Maudsley, supra note 127, at 364-65.
130. Dukeminier, supra note 121, at 63. Opponents of this theory warn that intro-
ducing the problems of causation into the Rule Against Perpetuities will complicate an
already intricate field of law. Does the lawyer who drafts the instrument in question
or the judge who construes it have a causal connection to the vesting of the interest?
For a debate on this issue, see Mechem, supra note 115, at 981-82; Leach, supra note
121, at 1143-44; Mechem, A Brief Reply to Professor Leach, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1155,
1156 (1960).
131. 48 D. & C.2d 607 (Orphan's Ct. 1968), vacated and remanded, 442 Pa. 172,
275 A.2d 336 (1971). The court was applying Pennsylvania's wait-and-see statute, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104(b) (1972).




for their lives, then to their surviving heirs ad infinitum, with the pro-
vision that when there were no more heirs, the trust was to be con-
tinued for various charities. 133  The trial court held that -the policies
of the wait-and-see doctrine were outweighted by the need to decide,
for estate tax purposes, the validity of the gift over to -the charities. 13 4
It proceeded to apply the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, hold-
ing that the gifts to descendants after the nephews and nieces were
void, as were the gifts to the charities. 135 The state supreme court re-
versed, acknowledging
the necessity, occasioned by the federal estate and state inheritance tax
laws, for a prompt determination of questions concerning future inter-
ests; however, owing to the ever-increasing extent of estate tax liability,
to recognize this principle would emasculate the "wait and see" rule.' 3 6
Applying the wait-and-see doctrine, the court held that the brothers'
and sisters' interests were valid because their parents' deaths made any
increase in their number impossible; thus, their class was closed. 137
The interests of the nieces and nephews were also valid because their
interests would vest no later than the death of the last brother or sister
(a life in being when the testator died). 38  The court noted -that at
common law the nephews and nieces would not be measuring lives be-
cause the brothers' wives and the sisters could still give birth to more
of them." 9 At this point, the court decided to wait and see:
In our view, three possible situations could occur by waiting and seeing.
First, if no additional nephews and nieces are born, not only do the
brothers and sisters qualify as measuring lives but also the six nephews
and nieces. Thus, the interest given to the grandnephews and grand-
nieces must necessarily vest within twenty-one years following the death
of the last surviving nephew or niece since membership in the class of
grandnephews and grandnieces could not, thereafter, increase. The gift
to the charities, if contingent, however, would be valid only if all the
grandnephews and grandnieces should produce no offspring.
Secondly, if no additional nephews and nieces and grandnephews and
grandnieces are born, not only do the brothers and sisters and nieces
133. Id. at 184-85, 275 A.2d at 340-41.
134. 48 D. & C.2d at 610.
135. Id. at 617.
136. 442 Pa. at 187, 275 A.2d at 342-44 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 189, 275 A.2d at 344.
138. Id. at 189-90, 275 A.2d at 344.
139. Id. at 190, 275 A.2d at 344.
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and nephews qualify as measuring lives but also the twenty-nine grand-
nephews and grandnieces. In this situation, the interest to great-grand-
nephews and great-grandnieces would be valid since that interest must
necessarily vest within twenty-one years after the death of the last sur-
viving grandnephew or grandniece. As before, the gift to charities, if
contingent, would be invalidated if any of the great-grandnephews or
great-grandnieces should produce offspring.
Thirdly, if any of the brothers and sisters should prove to be "fertile
octogenarians," then the common law's stress on possibilities coincides
with the statute's emphasis on aciualities and our earlier discussion of
the opinion of the court below controls.
Since which of the three situations will eventuate is unpredictable,
it is necessary that the "wait and see" rule be applied. 140
Clearly, the Pearson court did not believe that the measuring lives un-
der wait-and-see were the same as at common law. In considering the
possibility that generations beyond the brothers and sisters could be
measuring lives, it seems to have followed the causal connection theory,
since the nieces and nephews would have a causal connection to the
vesting of the interests of their children.141  Thus, in its first reported
application, the wait-and-see doctrine seems to have worked well,
choosing the measuring lives by the causal connection theory and
reaching a reasonable result. The case contained none of the problems
foreseen by the causal connection theory's opponents, 141 and the vast
majority of wait-and-see cases will probably be similarly uncomplicated.
Nevertheless, the general objections to the wait-and-see doctrine re-
main unanswered by the Pearson case. The nephews, nieces, their chil-
dren, the charities, and tax officials must now wait for years before the
validity of their interests is decided. It is unclear from the decision
whether the contingent remaindermen will have standing to enforce the
trustees' fiduciary duties. Nor did the court state from whom the tax
officials will collect once the estate's tax liability is determined. Such
uncertainty is particularly undesirable in a field of law whose value lies
in the predictability of the rights and obligations it creates.' 48 More-
over, although the wait-and-see doctrine seems not to have immediately
disordered the law of future interests in the Pearson case, it may cause
140. Id. at 190-91, 275 A.2d at 344 (emphasis original).
141. Perhaps because the causal connection theory Tesolved the case, the court did
not consider the all-inclusive theory.
142. See note 130 supra.




major damage in the future. If, when the time for decision finally
arrives, one or more of the future interests is declared void, then the
alienability of the trust property, one of the primary policies of the law
of future interests, will have been completely frustrated for however
long the wait-and-see period has lasted."'
By comparison, the common law Rule and its measuring life concept
seem to have worked satisfactorily on balance. "Even those technical
aspects of the Rule often referred to as producing unfortunate results
have caused surprisingly little difficulty,"' 4 and can be remedied by
legislation and case law development. 46 "For every case serving as
a reminder that the Rule needs improvement there are many showing
that it works fairly well when handled intelligently by counsel and
court."14  For the careful draftsman and his client, the common law
Rule provides certainty, which the wait-and-see doctrine does not. If
the policies of the Rule have any contemporary validity, they are better
promoted by retaining the Rule in its common law form.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE MEASURING LIFE CONCEPT
Since the adoption of the wait-and-see doctrine in nine jurisdictions,
no new developments in perpetuities law affecting the measuring life
concept have occurred. The wait-and-see movement itself has lost mo-
mentum as scholarly thinking and the Pearson case have shown it not
to be a cure-all for the deficiencies of the Rule.'48 It seems to have
been recognized that
144. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 179, 188
(1953); Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493, 495-
97 (1959). The danger that the wait-and-see doctrine will frustrate important policies
of the law of future interests gives modem validity to the famous statement of Justice
Blackstone in Perrin v. Blake, 96 Eng. Rep. 392, 393 (Ex. 1772), reported in full in
I F. HARGRAVE, TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAw OF ENGLAND 489, 498 (1787):
The law of real property in this country.. . is now formed into a fine arti-
ficial system, full of unseen connexions and nice dependencies; and he that
breaks one link of the chain, endangers the dissolution of the whole.
145. Sparks, supra note 144, at 500.
146. Leach, supra note 117, at 745-49; Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 488, 500-01 (1961). See also L. Smnvs, supra
note 7, at 74-80; R. LYNN, supra note 2, at 57-88 (chapter entitled "The Decline and
Fall of Fantastic Possibilities").
147. Lynn, supra note 146, at 501.
148. The first wait-and-see statute was enacted in 1947. No. 39, § 4(b), [1947] Pa.
Laws 104 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104(b) (1972)). During the 1950's,
five more states adopted the wait-and-see doctrine. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98
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[plerpetuities do not furnish a kernel which invites a statutory envelope.
The effort. . . to confine this body of law in a few sentences has been
made in enough different states during past centuries and with suffi-
ciently bad results to justify much hesitance in another attempt at its
statutory embodiment . . . . [Tihe subject matter of perpetuities has
so many facets . .'. and has so large an ingredient of policy, that the
effort to put it into a nutshell of any type is of necessity doomed to
failure. Any formulation of this body of law is likely to lack utility
almost in direct proportion as it increases its stress upon brevity. 40
At the same time that the wait-and-see doctrine has ceased to be
considered preferable to the common law Rule, the need for any Rule
Against Perpetuities at all has been questioned.'" It is said that the
removal of property from commerce, the ultimate social evil at which
the Rule is directed, 151 is no longer a problem. Almost all trusts cre-
ated today include a power, if not a duty, in the trustee to invade the
corpus, 'alter the investment portfolio, and even terminate the trust in
some situations.1'5 2  Unlike the static seventeenth century land trusts
that sparked the creation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 'almost all
modem trusts are composed of marketable securities and thus are
in the stream of commerce. 15 3 As for the few land trusts that remain,
modem developments in property law have greatly increased their
alienability regardless of unascertained contingent remaindermen.' 5"
N.H. 225, 231-32, 97 A.2d 207, 212 (1953); No. 233, § 1, [1955] Conn. Acts 210;
ch. 244, [1955] Maine Laws 200; ch. 641, § 1, [1954] Mass. Acts 637; No. 177, § 1,
[1957] Vt. Laws 139. Only three states adopted wait-and-see in the 1960's. Ch. 166,
§ 2, [1960] Ky. Acts 697; ch. 44, § 1, [1960] Md. Laws 157 (codified at MD. CoDnE
ANN. art. 93, § 11-103(a) (1969 Replacement Volume)); Act of July 25, 1967, [1967]
Ohio Laws 913 (codified at Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Anderson 1968)).
Since 1967, no state has adopted the doctrine, and the scholarly controversy has died
down. See 2 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & ThusT J. 179, 182 (1967).
149. Powell, Nutshells and Perpetuities, 7 U. Cm L. REv. 489, 495 (1940).
150. For an excellent summary of the policies said to support the Rule, see 84 HAv.
L. R v. 738, 739-40 n.5 (1971). Also note the statement of Lord Nottingham in the
Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949 (Ch. 1682), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963
(C.A. 1683), rev'd, 22 Eng. Rep. 963 (H.L. 1685):
[Perpetuities] do fight against God, for they pretend to such a Stability in hu-
man Affairs, as the Nature of them admits not of, and . . . are . . . therefore
not to be endured.
151. See note 48 supra.
152. L SM Es, supra note 7, at 41-42; Br6gy, A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute
on Perpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 313, 323 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs
§ 167 (1, 3) (1959).
153. L. SIMES, supra note 7, at 40-42.
154. Id. at 43-46; SIMES & SMTH §§ 1941, 1943.
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Finally, it is said that income and estate taxes have made it sheer folly
for testators to attempt to control their property far into the future.' 55
Supporters of the Rule Against Perpetuities reply that large fortunes
and restraints on alienation are not what the Rule is directed against, 56
and that despite taxes, testators, usually out of a disbelief in their chil-
dren's ability to manage money, continue ,to stretch the Rule to its limit
in their estate plans. While the original rationale for the Rule may
have ended in the industrial revolution, continued justifications for it
are found in the need to balance the desire of the present generation
to distribute its assets as it wishes against the identical desire of future
generations, " ' and in the social policy that the wealth of the world be
controlled by living persons.'5 8 These considerations apply to the Rule
generally and not specifically to the measuring life concept. There-
fore, the continued use of the measuring life concept is connected to
the future of the Rule itself. The decision on the Rule's contemporary
validity will determine what role the measuring life concept will play
in the law of future interests.
155. Leach, Perpetuities Reform: London Proposes, Perth Disposes, 6 U.W. AusL.
L. REV. 11, 12 (1963) (footnote omitted):
It is probably pointless for me to voice my belief that if there were no Rule
against Perpetuities today nobody would think of calling for one; the impact
of the income tax and death duties is such as to preclude the perpetuation of
great landed estates or even great personal fortunes, at which the Rule was
aimed. I cite as evidence our state of Wisconsin, which has its share of
wealthy men but no Rule against Perpetuities applicable to the usual testamen-
try or inter vivos trust. No inconvenience has appeared, for property owners
simply have no inclination to tie up property for long periods, the uncertainties
of life and taxes being what they are.
Contra, Waterbury, supra note 119, at 45-46 & n.28.
156. L. SIMEs, supra note 7, at 56-58; Waterbury, supra note 119, at 48-53.
157. L. SimEs, supra note 7, at 58-59; Br~gy, supra note 152, at 323; Tudor, The
Impact of Recent Statutory Adoption of the "Wait and See" Principle on the Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 38 B.U.L. REv. 540, 541 (1958).
158. L. SniEs, supra note 7, at 59-60; Allan, supra note 119, at 31-33; Sparks, supra
note 144, at 498.
Washington University Open Scholarship
